World Development
Abstract: Pro-environmental behavior, such as recycling, often needs to be regular to be effective, and interventions to encourage behavioral change may therefore need to be repeated; yet, little evidence exists on the optimal time pattern and frequency of such repeated interventions. To fill this gap, we investigate the impact of mobile text reminders on households’ recycling behavior in urban Peru by randomly varying the exposure length and continuity of reminders. We find that reminders increase both the likelihood that households start to recycle and the frequency of recycling among households that already did so before the intervention. The effects are stronger when reminders are repeated over a longer period. Our findings suggest that both limited attention and habit formation matter for recycling behavior, and that low-cost mobile text reminders can effectively support regular pro-environmental behavior.
Economic Journal
Abstract: In a field experiment among an extremely poor and stigmatised group in Namibia, we study the effect of a standard self-affirmation intervention – i.e., asking participants to recall experiences that made them feel successful and proud – on labour productivity. In a control condition, we simply ask participants to recall their daily routines. In both experimental conditions, participants then work on a real job with piece-rate incentives. Surprisingly, the self-affirmation intervention backfires: participants are substantially less productive than those in the control condition. An analysis of participants’ answers to the self-affirmation intervention suggests that the backfiring can be explained by difficulties in recalling positive experiences. To provide causal evidence for this conjecture, we conduct a well-powered online follow-up experiment with U.S. participants, which replicates the backfiring in a completely different context. Thus, our study provides evidence that standard self-affirmation interventions should be treated with some caution, as they may be ineffective and even counterproductive for those who would most need a boost in self-image and productivity. The unintended result notwithstanding, we provide clear evidence that productivity is malleable through psychological interventions.
Review of Economics and Statistics
Abstract: In a field experiment among 9,823 customers of the Namibian water utility, we implement interventions to reduce nonpayments. The interventions are based on diagnostic surveys to identify key obstacles to payments. They address informational frictions and apply psychological commitment techniques to narrow the gap between customers’ willingness to pay and actual payments. Initially, payments increase by 29% to 55%, making the interventions highly cost-effective. Removing informational frictions has a lasting impact, but the commitment techniques produce only short-term effects. We demonstrate the effectiveness and limitations of behavioral interventions in settings where heavy-handed tools (e.g., disconnecting nonpayers) are difficult to implement.
Journal of Development Economics
Abstract: I conduct a large-scale field experiment (N = 14,876) with a public water utility in Namibia to encourage water conservation during a drought. Providing a short list of specific conservation strategies via text message decreases residential water consumption by around 5.3 percent. Other treatment arms that ask individuals to use and develop their own strategies are ineffective, suggesting that individuals may lack knowledge on how to reduce their water consumption effectively. This interpretation is corroborated by survey evidence as most respondents struggle to name effective conservation strategies. As a secondary outcome, I examine whether the intervention influences the payment of water utility bills. Utility bills are often not paid in full in my setting, which affects the fiscal sustainability (i.e., cost recovery) of the water utility. I find that payments do not decrease. This implies that customers pay a larger amount of their bill, since they consume less water without reducing payments.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Abstract: Finding ways to encourage collective action in contexts where only a minority adopts the desired behavior is central to solving many of today's global environmental problems. We study how correcting people's beliefs about social norms and behavioral trends encourages collective action in a setting where the desired behavior is not yet prevalent. In a field experiment, we test whether low sign-up rates for a recycling program in urban Peru can be increased by providing information (1) that most people regard participation in the program as important, i.e., on the “injunctive norm”, (2) on an increasing recent trend in sign-up rates. We find that the effectiveness of the treatments depends on people's prior beliefs: Correcting inaccurate beliefs increases sign-up decisions significantly among people who either substantially underestimate the injunctive norm or who underestimate the positive trend. As this sub-group of people is in the minority in our set-up, we do not observe statistically significant average treatment effects. We further find that the effects of the treatments increase in the level of underestimation. Our evidence demonstrates that belief updating can be used effectively to encourage collective action where it is weak as long as a meaningful number of people underestimates the relevant trends and norms.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Abstract: In a lab-in-the-field experiment, we study how the pro-social behavior of inhabitants of an impoverished neighborhood in Namibia is influenced after being informed about the pro-social or egoistic behavior of either a rich or a poor comparison group. We find that the poor behave significantly less prosocial when they learn about the egoistic behavior of the rich. Yet, neither the rich's pro-social behavior nor information on how other poor individuals behaved affects the poor's behavior. This contagion effect is not simply driven by imitating the behavior of the comparison group, or by social identity concerns or peer pressure. Instead, our data suggest that the poor's drop in pro-social behavior is caused by the violation of a social justice norm: The poor expect the rich to be pro-social and they are surprised if they act differently. Learning about the rich's egoism even makes participants’ beliefs about what should be done (injunctive norms) significantly more egoistic. Hence, the self-serving behavior of the rich causes a double damage: Society not only suffers from their low pro-sociality but also from a spread of egoism among other members of society.
